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The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently addressed the issue
of whether the New Jersey Reparation Reform Act (No-Fault Act)
provision' which mandates insurance carrier renewals of automobile
insurance policies is applicable to an insurer opting to withdraw entirely from the state's automobile insurance market. 2 The No-Fault
Acts renewal provision denies licensed automobile insurers the right
to refuse renewals of policies issued in New Jersey absent the prior
approval of the commissioner of insurance.
The court, finding the
renewal provision applicable to withdrawing carriers, held in Sheeran
v. Nationwide ,Mutual Insuratice Co. 4 that such a carrier must
elect between compliance with the insurance commissioner's regulations governing nonrenewals or the relinquishment of its license to
engage in any insurance business in the state of New Jersey.
On October 13, 1977, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
announced its intention to withdraw from the New Jersey automobile
insurance market due to continuing business losses. 5 In pursuance
of this objective, Nationwide notified its agents that their contracts
would be cancelled. In addition, the carrier informed its policyholders that, while the company would honor contractual commitments
previously assumed, including any renewal guarantees in outstanding
policies through the end of the guarantee period, it did not intend to
renew an\y other automobile policies and would undertake no future
automobile insurance commitments in New Jersey.6
Subsequent to Nationwide's announcement, Insurance Commissioner James J. Sheeran instituted an action seeking a declaration that
I N.J. STAT. ANN'. § 39:6A-3 (West 1973).
2 Sheeran v. Nationwide \Iut, Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 404 A.2d 625 (1979).
3 The No-Fault Act provides in pertinent part: "No licensed insurance carrier shall refuse
to renew the required coverage stipulated by this act without the consent of the Commissioner
of Insurance." N.J. STAr. ANN. § 39:6A-3 (West 1973).
80 N.J. 548, 561, 404 A.2d 625, 631 (1979).
I1d. at 552, 404 A.2d at 627.
A substantial inmlber of Nationwide's automobile policies contained guarantees of
renewal: "As of December 31, 1977, Nationwide had outstanding 56,555 voluntary automobile
insurance policies, 35,009 of which were guaranteed renewable for five years." Reply Brief for
Defendants-Petitioners and Second Supplemental Index at 1, Sheeran v. Nationwide \lt.
1ns.
Co., 163 N.J. Super. 40, 394 A.2d 149 (App. Div. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Reply Brief for
Defendants-Petitioners].
6 Id.
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Nationwide either renew in force automobile insurance policies in ac-

cordance with the mandatory renewal provision of the No-Fault Act
and the regulations issued pursuant thereto 7 or surrender its license
to do business in the state. 8 Commissioner Sheeran contended that
Nationwide's refusal to renew its policies violated the No-Fault Act

because financial loss by a carrier was not listed among the acceptable
grounds established for valid nonrenewals. 9
Nationwide responded that the New Jersey No-Fault Act was inapplicable in cases where a carrier was withdrawing from an entire
line of insurance as the result of continuing business losses, rather,
the act was designed to prevent active carriers from exercising arbitrary and discriminatory nonrenewal practices against individual

policyholders. 10

Nationwide further maintained that the No-Fault

Act should be interpreted in pari materia with the Agency Termina-

tion Act, 11 which governed the renewal rights of terminated agents

I N.J. ADMN. CODE § 11:3-8.1 (1979). The administrative regulations established by the
New Jersey Department of Insurance bar unjustified nonrenewals of automobile insurance
policies. See id. § 11:3-8. 1(e) (1979). Among the grounds deemed to justify nonrenewals are the
insured's involvement in certain types of accidents, motor vehicle violations, use of the automobile in professional racing and physical or mental impairment of the insured. See id. §
11:3-8. 1(e)(1)-(8) (1979).
Of particular pertinence to this case is the following exception to the renewal requirement.
which allows nonrenewals in the event that a carrier is able to substitute similar coverage with
another insurer for its own:
Request by producer of record not to renew policy, provided such request is accompanied by a true statement by the producer that he has replaced like coverage
at approved rates in the voluntary market with an admitted carrier . . . provided
also that the transferor carrier has advised the insured . . . of his right to renewal in
the same company before obtaining the insured's consent to transfer, and of the
insured's right to renew if he or she is cancelled by the new carrier for reasons
other than nonpayment or suspension or revocation of registration or driver's
license.
Id. § 11:3-8. I(c)(11) (1979).
80 N.J. at 553, 404 A.2d at 627.
9 Id. at 555. 404 A.2d at 628.
i' Id. at 553-54, 404 A.2d at 627-28. Nationwide was reluctant to surrender its license because retention of the license facilitated the servicing of national accounts. Id. at 553, 404 A.2d
at 627.
" Id. at 554, 404 A.2d at 628. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:22-6.14a (West Cuin. Supp. 1980).
The Agency Termination Act sets minimun requirements for the renewal of policies upon
the termination of an agent. The Act provides in pertinent part:
The company shall during a period of 9 months from the effective date of such
termination, upon request in writing of the terminated agent, renew all contracts of
insurance for such agent for said company as may be in accordance with said company's then current underwriting standards and pay to the terminated agent a
commission in accordance with the previous agency contract of the terminated
agent.
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and with which Nationwide had agreed to comply. 12 A number of
constitutional objections were also registered against the commissioner's interpretation of the statute, the most significant being a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 13 Finally,
Nationwide contended that the statute's grant of authority to the insurance commissioner constituted an invalid delegation of legislative
authority. 14
The trial court, ruling in favor of the insurance commissioner,
ordered Nationwide to either comply with the statute or surrender its
license. 15 On appeal, both the appellate division 16 and the supreme
court 17 a lirmed the lower court's holding.
Justice Pashman, delivering the supreme court opinion, relied
upon the "plain meaning rule" of statutory construction and
explained: "'[T]he meaning of a statute must ... be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' " 18
Since the phraseology of the no-fault statute's renewal provision
clearly requires commissioner approval for all nonrenewals of automobile insurance policies, Justice Pashman concluded that adherence to the plain meaning rule compelled the court to apply the provision according to its absolute terms because "t]here is ... no room
for judicial interpretation.''19 Furthermore, notwithstanding the

12 80 N.J. at 554, 404 A.2d at 628.

In exchange for release from exclusive representation and noncompetition covenants, most
of Nationwide's agents signed a release waiving their rights to request renewals. Brief and
Appendix on behalf of Plaintiff-Respondent Commissioner of Insurance at 5-7, Sheeran v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 163 N.J. Super. 40, 394 A.2d 149 (App. Div. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent]. Nationwide thereby attempted to circumvent any opportunity
for renewal under the provisions of the Agency Termination Act. The question of whether
Nationwide's eflorts were successful was rendered moot when the carrier voluntarily agreed to
honor nine-month renewal requests by its terminated agents. 80 N.J. at 553, 404 A.2d at 627.
i" 80 N.J. at 554, 404 A.2d at 628. The due process clause, in pertinent part, provides: [No
state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law
"
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14 80 N.J. at 554, 404 A.2d at 628.
is Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.J. Super. 417, 425, 388 A.2d 272, 276 (Ch.
Div. 1978).
6 Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 163 N.J. Super. 40, 41, 394 A.2d 149, 149 (App.
Div. 1978).
17 80 N.J. at 561, 404 A.2d at 631.
i8 1d. at 556, 404 A.2d at 629 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(191i7)).
The Camiietti court clearly enunciated this primary rule of statutory construction: -[W]hen
words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative intent,
and are not to be added to or subtracted from by . . . any extraneous source." 242 U.S. at 490.
9 80 N.J. at 556, 404 A.2d at 629.
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plain meaning rule, the court examined the legislative history of the
No-Fault Act and found that it provided no basis for a contrary
conclusion. Noting that the legislature had been apprised of the possibilitv of wholesale nonrenewals during the public hearings which
preceded the enactment of the No-Fault Act 20 and, therefore, presumably acted in accordance with this knowledge, the court rejected
Nationwide's suggestion of an unexpressed exemption for carriers
withdrawing from an entire line of insurance.21 The majority
adopted the position that the legislature's two-pronged intent was to
ensure that companies carried their fair share of the burden of providing automobile coverage in the state and to guarantee insureds the
right to renew indefinitely with the same company. 22
Nationwide's last attempt to obtain a favorable construction of
the no-fault statute was rejected when the court refused to read the
Act in pari materia with the Agency Termination Law . 23 The court
posited that an act which has as its primary concern the persons and
the specific issue in question, namely, policyholders and their renewal rights with respect to automobile insurance policies, controls in
the event of a "facial conflict" with a more generally applicable statute
governing the renewal rights of terminated agents in all lines of insurance. 24
The court then focused upon Nationwide's constitutional challenges. The contention that the no-fault statute lacked adequate standards to guide the insurance commissioner in his decisions to grant or
withhold permission for nonrenewals and, therefore, constituted an
undue delegation of legislative authority was found unacceptable. 25 hn
reaching this conclusion, Justice Pashman relied upon the principles
governing valid grants of legislative authority as set forth in Avant v.
Clifford. 26 He held that the statute, by restricting the commissioner

20 Id. at 556-57,

404 A.2d at 629. See CoINmissioN TO STUDY CERTAIN AUTOMOBILE IN-

SURANCE MATTERS, INCLUDING A "No FAULT" AUTO ACCIDENT INSURANCE PLAN: PUBLIC
HEARING, VOL. I at 69-70, 63 A (March 30, 1971).
21 80 N.J. at 557, 404 A.2d at 629.
22 Id. The court seemed particularly concerned that Nationwide's retention of its license
subsequent to a refusal to renew existing policies would enable it to select desirable new
policyholders in the future and thus circumvent the statutory scheme. Id. But see Reply Brief
for Defendants-Petitioners, supra note 6, wherein Nationwide voiced its willingness "to mak[e]
any future re-entry into the New Jersey insurance market subject to the Commissioner's approval." Id. at 2.
23 80 N.J. at 557, 404 A.2d at 629-30.
24 Id. at 557-58, 404 A.2d at 629-30.
25 Id. at 558, 404 A.2d at 630.
26 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975). The Avant court concluded:
[T]here can be "ino unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority as long as the
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to the promulgation of "reasonable rules and regulations" in furtherance of the purposes of' the Act, sufficiently circumscribed his authority to comply VWith constitutional requirements. 27

Nationwide's claim that the mandatory renewal provision violated
its due process rights was also rejected. The court noted that comprehensive regulations governing the insurance industry have long
been upheld because "the insurance business is strongly affected with
a public interest .

"28
28. Rather than an unconstitutional deprivation

of Nationwide's property, the renewal provision was held to be no
more than a reasonable regulation governing automobile policies-

policies which were both voluntarily issued by the insurance carrier
and which were nonrenewable so long as the insurer was willing to
surrender its license. 29

Justice Mountain, in his dissenting opinion, conceded that a literal reading of the No-Fault Act would mandate policy renewals indefinitely;3 0 however, he argued: " 'IT]here is no surer way to misread

any document than to read it literally.' "31 He found the statutory
renewal provision inapplicable to Nationwide because he concluded
that an examination of the legislative intent behind the Act revealed

its sole goal to be the elimination of arbitrary and discriminatory policy nonrenewals in individual cases.32
The "plain meaning rule," to which Justice Mountain took exception, bars any judicial interpretation of a statute absent an ambiguity

administrative discretion is hemmed in by standards sufficiently definitive to guide
its exercise," such standards not necessarily being stated "in express terms if they
may be reasonably inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole."
Id. at 553, 341 A.2d at 661 (quoting Association of N.J. State College Faculties, Inc. v. Board of
Higher Educ., 112 N.J. Super. 237, 258-59, 270. A.2d 744, 756 (Law Div. 1970)) (emphasis
added).
27 80 N.J. at 558-59, 404 A.2d at 630.
28 Id. at 559, 404 A.2d at 630-31.
29 Id. at 559-60, 404 A.2d at 630-31. The court did support, however, Nationwide's right to
a reasonable profit, but suggested that the proper remedy lay in an action to increase rates
rather than in an attack on the constitutionality of the no-fault law. Id. at 560, 404 A.2d at 631.
30 Id. at 561, 404 A.2d at 631 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
31 Id. (quoting Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concur-

ring)).
32 Id. at 561-62, 404 A.2d at 632 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain attached great
weight to an explanation of the purpose of the no-fault statute's mandatory renewal provision
provided in a book written by the legal counsel to the Automobile Insurance Study Commission. Id. at 562, 404 A.2d at 632. This explanation supported the view that the purpose of the
provision was the elimination of unjustified and discriminatory nonrenewal practices against in-

dividual policyholders. See M. IAvIocoLl, No FAULT AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN NEW
JERSEY, 101-02 (1973).
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iii the phraseology of the Act. 33 This rule has been subjected to
much scholarly criticism, 3 and courts have honored it as much in the
breach as in the application. 3 Irrespective of whether the language
of a statute should be regarded as the sole manifestation of legislative
purpose, the language chosen by the legislature to express its will

should certainly be accorded great weight in any determination of
legislative intent. The wording of the no-fault statute's renewal provision is clear and absolute-no exception is made to the requirement
of commissioner approval for any nonrenewal of automobile coverage
by a licensed insurance carrier.
In addition to the legislative intent evidenced by the actual
wording of the statute, a scrutiny of the historical background of the
New Jersey No-Fault Act confirms the conclusion that the renewal

provision was not designed to exempt carriers electing to withdraw
from an entire line of insurance. In February, 1968, the New Jersey
insurance commissioner denied a request for a 20.6% rate increase for
automobile and casualty carriers. 36 Widespread industry reaction, in

33See, e.g., Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (1977). The plain
meaning rule is singularly the most fundamental rule of statutory construction. See H. BLACK,
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS §§ 25 & 26 (2d ed. 1911); 2A SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (3d ed., C. Sands, ed., 1973).
The very limited role of the court in the interpretation of a statute clear upon its face has
been summed up as follows:
Even though the court should be convinced that some other meaning was really
intended bv the law-making power, and even though the literal interpretation
should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, still the explicit declaration of
the legislature is the law, and the courts must not depart from it.
H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 26 (2d ed. 1911).
Township of Brick v. Spivak, 95 N.J. Super. 401, 231 A.2d 380 (App. Div.), aff'd, 49 N.J.
400, 230 A.2d 503 (1967), hypothesized that the underlying justification for the plain meaning
rule lay in the doctrine of separation of powers: "[The Judiciary] should not assume the function
of the Legislature and rewrite the law to include therein something which those charged with
the legislative responsibility might have inserted if the matter had been called to their attention." Id. at 406, 231 A.2d at 383 (emphasis in original).
'4 See, e.g., Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes,
24 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1940).
35 Compare Myers v. Cedar Grove Tp., 36 N.J. 51, 61, 174 A.2d 890, 895 (1961) and
Hoffman v. Hock, 8 N.J. 397, 409, 86 A.2d 121, 126 (1952) and Lehmann v. Kanane, 88 N.J.

Super. 262, 265, 212 A.2d 35, 37 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 45 N.J. 591, 214 A.2d 29 (1965)
(utilizing the "plain meaning rule" in statutory interpretation) with New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338, 288 A.2d 855, 859 (1972) and San-Lan
Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N.J. 148, 155, 145 A.2d 457, 461 (1958) and Caputo v. The Best
Foods, 17 N.J. 259, 263-64, 111 A.2d 261, 263 (1955) (rejecting statutory language as the sole
determinant of statutory meaning).
36 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

STUDY COMMISSION ON REPARATION REFORM FOR NEW JERSEY MOTORISTS, at 2-3 (1971)
[hercinafter cited as REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR].
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the form of cancellations, nonrenewals, agency terminations and restrictive underwriting practices, combined with a leading insurance
carrier's announced intent not to renew any automobile policies is-

sued in the state, created an insurance
the New Jersey insurance market. 3 A
alleviate the problem, and the situation
when, because of "the imminent peril

cost and availability crisis in
rate increase in 1970 failed to
climaxed in June of that year
of an unprecedented restric-

tion in the New Jersey [automobile insurance] market," 3 8 the insur-

ance commissioner declared a 90-day moratorium on all policy terminations. 39
On June 18, 1970, the legislature established the Automobile Insurance Study Commission to consider, among other matters, the

40
feasibilitv of a no-fault automobile insurance plan for New Jersey.
III its report recommending the adoption of such a plan, the study

commission noted that, because of the grave insurance situation, it

"did not lose sight of the importance to New Jersey motorists of an
adequate supply of insurance coverage." 4 1 Indeed, an "availability
objective" was listed among the four major foci of the commission' s
recommendations. 42
There is certainly no question that one objective of the no-fault
statute was the protection of individual policyholders through the
43
elimination of arbitrary and discriminatory underwriting practices.
The historical background of the No-Fault Act and the Automobile
Insurance Study Commission's report indicate, however, that the
promotion of the general availability of automobile insurance to New
Jersey residents was an additional objective. 44

37 Id. See also COMMISSION

TO STUDS

CERTAIN AUroMOBILE

INSURANCE

MATTERS,

IN-

VOL. 1.

at 69-70

NEGLIGENCE IN NEW JERSEY,

101-02

CLUDING A "No FAULT" AUTO ACCIDENT INSURANCE PLAN: PUBLIC HEARING,

(March 30, 1971).
38 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, sipra note 36, at 3-4.
39 Id. at 3.
40 1I. at vi.
41 1i. at 4.
42 Id. at 7.
43 Se,

M. IAVIOCOLI,

No FAULT AND COMPARATIVE

(1973). See also Department of Insurance Inter-Communication fromn Richard C. McDonough,
Commissioner of Insurance, to James Heaney, Asst. Counsel to Governor (May 17, 1972) (New
Jersey State Archives, New Jersey State Library).
44 It is apparent from the administrative regulations promnulgated by the commissioner of
insurance that, in the commissioner's view, a two-fold wrong was to be remedied by the statute.
The majority of these regulations proscribe discriminatory practices against individual
policyholders. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-8.1 (1979). Of particular significance to this case,
however, is N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-8.1(e)(11) (1979), which balances the insurer's interests
with the state interest in affording an adequate insurance market to its residents bv allowing a
carrier to avoid the renewal requirement if it can replace its coverage with similar coverage in
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The no-fault statutes of Hawaii and Massachusetts, both enacted
prior to the New Jersey statute, embody such an availability objective
and squarely address the issue of a carrier's retention of its license
subsequent to blanket policy nonrenewals resulting from the termination of an entire line of coverage. The Massachusetts law deprives a
carrier of its insurance license for across-the-board refusals to renew
motor vehicle liability policies absent commissioner determination
that the insurer is not attempting to circumvent the statute. 45

The

Hawaii provision permits nonrenewals of automobile policies only if
an insurer ceases to underwrite any new policies of any kind in the

state or if the insurance commissioner concludes that such renewals
would impair the carrier's financial soundness.46 To conclude, however, that the New Jersey No-Fault Act's renewal provision was not
intended to be applicable to carriers abandoning the state's automobile insurance market because the New Jersey legislature failed
to expressly provide for this situation in the manner of Hawaii and
Massachusetts 47 would be doubly unsound. Certainly, more than one

method may be utilized to express the same intention. The No-Fault
Act's absolute pronouncement that "No licensed insurance carrier

shall refuse to renew the required coverage . . . without the consent
of the Commissioner of Insurance"-4 8 as effectively precludes any exception for withdrawing carriers as would a statute that spelled out
the absence of such an exception in explicit detail. To require more

would be to establish redundancy as a rule of statutory construction.
Secondly, assuming argueudo that this particular application of the
renewal provision escaped the contemplation of the draftsmen, a bar
to this application does not automatically arise; rather, the judicial
task in such a case is to determine whether the inclusion of the unforeseen situation within the scope of the statute is consistent with
the probable legislative intent.49

the voluntarv market. This interpretation of the statute bn the administrative agent charged
with its enforcement is entitled to great weight. In re Application of Saddle River, 71 N.J. 14,
24, 362 A.2d 552, 557-58 (1976). But see Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521,
528, 197 A.2d 673, 677 (1964), wherein the court explained: "An administrative agency may not
under the guise of interpretation extend a statute to include persons not intended, nor may it
give the statute any greater effect that its language allows." Id.
45 See MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 175, §§ 22E & 22H (Michie/Law Co-op. 1977).
46 See HAWAII REV. STATS. § 294-9(d) (1976).
17 See Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Amicus Curiae, National Association of Independent
Insurers at 13-17, Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. his. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 404 A.2d 625 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae].
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-3 (West 1973) (emphasis added).
49 Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 29 N.J. 303, 313, 148 A.2d 793, 798 (1959). See, e.g., Browder v.
United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S.

253, 257 (1937).
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Nationwide's final contention that the commissioner had misinterpreted the scope of the no-fault renewal provision, grounded in a

belief that the No-Fault Act was designed to be read in pari materia
with the Agency Termination Act, was based on the latter law's requirement of a nine-month renewal of policies issued by a terminated
agent. Since, prior to the enactment of the No-Fault Act, the Agency

Termination Act had already provided for the continuation of policies
which lapsed as a result of a carrier's termination of
Nationwide argued that the no-fault statute's mandate of
indeterminate duration was not meant to apply in such a
The law is well settled, however, that in the event of

its agents,
renewals of
situation. 50
a "conflict"

between a specific and general statute, the specific statute prevails. 51 The Agency Termination Act is concerned almost exclusively
with agent rights and the protection of commissions. Renewals are

mandated only upon the request of the agent, while the desires of the
policyholder are to no effect. 52 The policyholder nine-month renewal privilege, therefore, is merely an ancillary benefit. The No-

Fault Act, on the other hand, is specifically designed to establish
policyholder rights. Furthermore, its scope is limited to automobile
insurance policies. The objectives of the two statutes, while not incompatible, are certainly distinct. The specificity of application of the
no-fault statute demands precise compliance with its terms rather

than accommodation to the generally applicable provisions of the
Agency Termination Act.

As Justice Pashman concluded, all of Nationwide's statutory construction arguments are unpersuasive. 53 Nationwide's contention
that the no-fault renewal provision constituted a "taking" violative of

the due process clause, in that the statute required the carrier to
allocate its resources to a particular line of coverage, 54 also fails as an
50 80 N.J. at 557-58, 404 A.2d at 629-30.
5' E.g., Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co.,

55 N.J. 336, 339, 262 A.2d 193, 194

(1970); State v. Dilley, 48 N.J. 383, 386-87, 226 A.2d 1, 3 (1967); State v. Hotel Bar Foods,
Inc., 18 N.J. 115, 128, 112 A.2d 726, 734 (1955).
52 See N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 17:22-6.14a (West Cum. Supp. 1980).

5' A situation analogous to Sheeran v. Nationwide was addressed by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 339 A.2d 291
(1975). The St. Paul court was asked to determine whether a statute mandating renewals of
medical malpractice policies applied to carriers withdrawing from all medical malpractice coverage due to underwriting losses. The court held the statute to be inapplicable, 275 Md. at 144,
339 A.2d at 299, but to place reliance on this decision in determining the outcome of Sheeran
v. Nationwide Mut. Iis. Co. would be to beg the question, for the Maryland statute, by its
terms, only forbade nonrenewals "for any arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly discriminatory reason
... [or] except by the application of standards which are reasonably related to the insurer's
economic and business purposes." Id. at 137-38, 339 A.2d at 295.
- 80 N.J. at 559, 404 A.2d at 631.
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effective argument when examined in view of the insurance industry's
traditional treatment as a "regulated industry."
The United States Supreme Court made its classic determination
of the due process rights of regulated industries in Mumi v.Ilflnois, 5
wherein the Court stated: "When . . . one devotes his property to a
use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good ..
"56
The Court further noted
that "[the owner of such property] may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit
57
to the control."

The business of insurance has long been considered to be an
58
In Osborn v. Oslin,59 the
Court held that a "special relation" exists between government and
industry of widespread public interest.

the insurance industry in that government has long engaged in wide-

spread and thorough regulation of this industry. 60 The degree of this

"special relation" is manifested today in the fact that virtually
every

phase of a modern insurance carrier's operation is subjected to detailed regulation 6 ' and these regulations have long withstood due
process challenges. 62 Indeed, with respect to the state's regulatory
authority over insurance carriers, the United States Supreme Court,

55 94 U.S.

113 (1876).

56 1d. at 126.
57 id.

5" E.g., O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257 (1931): German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 412-15 (1914). This public interest is rooted in the fact
that the efficiency and solvency of insurance carriers are matters of grave concern to society at
large:
Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all
walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United States.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter's Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944).
59 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
60 1d. at 65.
61 See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 8.3 (1971).
62 See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159-60 (1931)
(upholding mandatory arbitration clauses); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 448 (1928)
(permitting rate reduction by insurance commissioner); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557,
566 (1869) (upholding imposition of mandatory contractual terms).
Similar regulations in other highly regulated industries have been held to adequately fulfill
due process requirements. In Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1095
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), the court upheld a requirement that a railroad maintain an unprofitable line
against an assertion that this constituted a "taking." Id. at 1100. In United Fuel Gas Co. v.
Railroad Comm'r, 278 U.S. 300 (1929), an order that a public utility continue service in certain
undesirable locations or withdraw entirely from the state was upheld against contentions that
the order violated due process requirements. Id. at 309.
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in California Automobile Ass'n v. Maloney, 63 stated: "[T]he power of
the state is broad enough to take over the whole business. . . . The
state may therefore hold its hand on condition that local needs be
64
serviced by the business."
Against such a background, Nationwide's assertion that the New
Jersey No-Fault Act violates its right to due process collapses.
Nationwide has not been forced to underwrite a single additional risk
by the terms of the no-fault statute's renewal provision; the Act

merely mandates, as a condition for continued licensure, the renewal

65
of obligations voluntarily assumed by Nationwide in the past.
Since Nationwide fully retains its right to avoid the renewal requirements by surrendering its New Jersey license or, in the event that
Nationwide instead elects to continue business in the state, to earn a

"reasonable profit" as provided for under New Jersey law, 66 the carrier has been deprived of no property by this statute. The mandatory

renewal provision is, therefore, no more than the imposition of a

legitimate control on the business decisions of a highly regulated industry. 67
Finally, Nationwide's argument that the No-Fault Act provides
for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, by failing to
provide adequate standards to guide the insurance commissioner in

63 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
64 1d. at 110. In this case, the Court dismissed a due process challenge against a California
statute which mandated equitable apportionment among insurers of applicants unable to obtain
coverage in the voluntary market. Id. at 110-11. The Court commented: [The insurer's] business may of course be less prosperous as a result of [a] regulation. That diminution in value.
however, has never amounted to the dignity of a taking in the constitutional sense." Id. at 111.
65 Brief and Appendix in Opposition to Petition fur Certification at 8, Sheeran v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 404 A.2d 625 (1979).
As a practical matter, the likelihood that Nationwide will have to renew its automobile
insurance policies in perpetuity is slight since, in view of Nationwide's termination of its agents
and notification of its insureds of its intention to withdraw from the automobile insurance market in New Jersey, most policyholders will probably seek coverage elsewhere. See Brief for
Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 12, at 8-10.
" See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29A-11 (West 1973). But cf Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae,
supra note 47, at 37 n.13 (asserting that the right to a reasonable profit is largely "illusory" in
that the process by which carriers may obtain relief from inadequate rates is long and cumbersome and often unproductive of anything other than marginal increases).
67 Compliance with the due process clause of the federal constitution requires only that a
statute "'not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected . .. have a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained." Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 525 (1934). New Jersey certainlv has the right to provide for the availability of automobile insurance to its residents, and a statutory provision and administrative regulations
providing for renewal of automobile policies absent justifiable cause for nonrenewal, or unless
similar coverage is obtainable in the voluntary market, bear a reasoiable relation to the attainment of that goal.
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the exercise of the discretionary powers entrusted to him, was prop-

erly rejected by the court. The no-fault statute's command that the
commissioner of insurance promulgate "such reasonable rules and
regulations as may be required to effectuate the purposes of this

act" 68 provides a sufficient guideline for the commissioner. Although

it is fundamental that a valid delegation of legislative authority must
provide adequate standards to the administrator for the exercise of
that authority, 69 exhaustive guidelines hemming in an administrator's
discretion are not constitutionally mandated. 70 As explained by one
New Jersey court: "A statute need establish no more than a sufficient

basic standard, i.e., a definite policy and rule of action which will
serve as a guide for the administrative agency ....

."71

Furthermore,

the standards defining the scope of the delegated authority need not
even be stated in express terms in a statute if these standards can be

reasonably inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole, that is,
from the legislative history and objectives of the Act as well as from
the statutory context.

72

In assessing the adequacy of legislative

guidelines, the courts' approach is one of "flexibility and liberality."

8

73

A willingness by the courts to uphold broad grants of legisla-

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 39:6A-19 (West 1973) (emphasis added).

69 See, e.g.,Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123, 93 A.2d 385, 388 (1952).
70 See Camarata v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 140 A.2d 397 (1958), in which
the court clearly rejected such a proposition:
It is settled beyond controversy that the Legislature may enact statutes setting
forth in broad design its intended aims, leaving the detailed implementation of the
policy thus expressed to an administrative agency. . . . [T]hrough the entrustment
of such powers, our lawmakers achieve expert and flexible control in areas where
the diversity of circumstances and situations to be encountered forbids the enactment of legislation anticipating every possible problem which may arise and providing for its solution.
Id. at 410, 140 A.2d at 400.
71 Department of Health v. Ovens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J. Super. 366, 383, 242
A.2d 21, 29-30 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 53 N.J. 248, 250 A.2d 11 (1969). The fundamental
rationale to be utilized by courts in assessing the adequacy of the standards set forth in delegations of authority was provided in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737
(D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the court posited that a principle of accountability underlies the
standards required of legislative grants of authority. The court articulated the view that the
grant of authority need ony draw such a demarcation that the legislature, courts, and public are
capable of ascertaining whether an administrator's actions were within the scope of his authoritv. Id. at 746.
72 See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 552-53, 341 A.2d 629, 660-61 (1975); Schierstead v.
City of Brigantine, 20 N.J. 164, 169, 119 A.2d 5, 8 (1955); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123, 93
A.2d 385, 388 (1952).
71 See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Holderman, 75 N.J. Super. 455, 474, 183 A.2d 454, 464
(App. Div. 1962), aff d, 39 N.J. 355, 188 A.2d 599 (1963).
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tive authority against constitutional challenges has been evident on
many occasions 74 and is attributable to the courts' recognition of "the
75
exigencies of modern government."
In view of the foregoing, the delegation of legislative authority
encompassed in the New Jersey No-Fault Act is constitutionally
sound. The discretion of the commissioner of insurance is restricted
to the establishment of regulations which are both reasonable and in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The historical background and
legislative objectives of the no-fault statute clearly indicate that regulations which either prevent arbitrary and discriminatory renewal
practices or ensure an adequate insurance market for New Jersey
motorists were within the contemplation of the legislature. The New
Jersey legislature was certainly free to leave the detailed implementation of these objectives to an administrative agency.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey correctly concluded that the
New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act established commissioner approval as an absolute prerequisite for valid nonrenewals by
licensed insurers. A carrier effecting a complete withdrawal from the
automobile insurance market in the state must, therefore, elect between compliance with the regulations promulgated by the commissioner of insurance, pursuant to the powers and duties validly delegated to him, or the relinquishment of its license to engage in any
insurance business in New Jersey. Both the absolute language of the
No-Fault Act itself and the events immediately preceding that Act's
passage demand this holding, and the due process rights of highly
regulated insurance carriers are in no way breached by a statute
which, thus construed, confronts them with a choice between two
such alternatives.
Moira L. Brophy

71 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (commissioner instructed to
promulgate regulations restricting prices to those which - 'in his judgment will be generally fair
and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act' ") Elizabeth Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v.
Howell, 30 N.J. 190, 194, 152 A.2d 359, 361 (1959) (maintenance of an association as a bank
branch office authorized if the branch was in the ' 'public interest' ");In re Berardi, 23 N.J.
485, 490, 129 A.2d 705, 707-08 (1957) (revocation of private detective licenses allowed " 'for
cause' ").
71 Association of N.J. State College Faculties, Inc. v. Board of Higher Educ., 112 N.J.
Super. 237, 258, 270 A.2d 744, 756 (Law Div. 1970).

